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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court, having granted the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(5) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court and the court of appeals 
erred by determining that trespassers are members of the "public" 
for purposes of satisfying the Dedication Statute. On certiorari, 
this Court does not review the decision of the trial court but 
rather that of the court of appeals, which this Court reviews for 
correction of error. Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, KlO, 26 
P. 3d 193 (citing State ex rel. M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, f8, 12 
P.3d 80); see also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988)). 
2. Whether the district court and the court of appeals 
erred by determining that the Bennie Creek Road had been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare as required by the 
Dedication Statute. Rather than reviewing the decision of the 
trial court, this Court, on certiorari, reviews the decision of 
the court of appeals, which is reviewed for correction of error. 
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Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, flO, 2 6 P. 3d 193 (citing 
State ex rel. M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, 1(8, 12 P. 3d 80); see also 
Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) 
(citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
3. Whether the court of appeals erred by determining that 
the Dedication Statute does not require a specific ten-year period 
of continuous use. On certiorari, this Court does not review the 
decision of the trial court but rather that of the court of 
appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of error. Harper 
v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, 1(10, 26 P. 3d 193 (citing State ex 
rel. M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, 118, 12 P.3d 80); see also Landes 
v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (citing 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
4. Whether the court of appeals erred by determining that 
the statutory damages in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 are automatic, 
and that the district court has no discretion in awarding such 
damages. As previously set forth, instead of reviewing the 
decision of the trial court, this Court, on certiorari, reviews 
the decision of the court of appeals, which is reviewed for 
correction of error. Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, flO, 26 
P.3d 193 (citing State ex rel. M.W. and S.W., 2000 UT 79, |^ 8, 12 
P.3d 80); see also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 
2 
1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988)). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative in the 
instant appeal, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate 
citation, in the body and arguments of the instant Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves critical questions concerning the 
requisite legal principles and elements for dedication and 
abandonment of a private road to the public use and the statutory 
damages for failing to remove an installation within the right-of-
way of a highway. The court of appeals misinterpreted and 
misapplied the law in the course of rendering its opinion. 
Utah County and the State of Utah initiated this case by 
suing Petitioners, as property owners, seeking a determination 
that the route described as the Bennie Creek Road be deemed to 
have been dedicated and abandoned to the public use pursuant to 
statute. Upon denying the request of Utah County and the State 
for a temporary restraining order, Petitioners denied the 
allegations. Subsequent mediation efforts failed. 
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The parties appeared before the district court over the 
course of several days for trial. Following trial, the district 
court issued a Memorandum Decision, concluding that the Bennie 
Creek Road had been dedicated and abandoned to the public use. In 
its decision, the district court denied Utah County's request for 
statutory damages based on the alleged failure to remove a gate. 
Petitioners filed a timely appeal and Utah County cross 
appealed. After oral argument, the court of appeals issued a 
published opinion in which it affirmed in part and remanded in 
part for a determination of statutory damages owed to Utah County. 
See Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 147 P. 3d 963. 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. This 
Court granted the Petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Utah County and the State of Utah, in October of 2000, 
sued Petitioners, as property owners, alleging illegal closure of 
a public road and easement as well as unjust enrichment (RR. 1-12, 
186-99). In the Complaint, Utah County and the State sought a 
judicial determination that the route described as the Bennie 
Creek Road be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the 
4 
public use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-1041 and its 
predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (R. 6) . 
2. After the court denied the request of Utah County and 
the State for a temporary restraining order (R. 118-20), 
Petitioners denied the allegations (R. 268-77) . Subsequent 
attempts to mediate the matter failed (See, e.g., RR. 1285-89, 
1372) . 
3. Over the course of several days in June 2004, 
Petitioners appeared before the district court for trial (R. 1442-
55) . 
4. Thereafter, the district court issued its decision, 
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated and 
abandoned to the public use (R. 1456-73)2. In its decision, the 
district court denied Utah County's request for statutory damages 
based on the alleged failure to remove a gate (R. 1458-59). 
5. Petitioners filed a timely appeal (R. 1620-23). Utah 
County cross appealed (R. 1630-31). 
6. Following oral argument, the court of appeals issued a 
published opinion in which it affirmed in part and remanded in 
lSee Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001), a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
2A true and correct copy of the district court's Memorandum 
Decision (R. 1456-73) and its subsequent Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 1507-26) memorializing the decision 
are attached hereto as Addendum B. 
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part for a determination of statutory damages owed to Utah County. 
See Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 147 P.3d 963, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
7. Petitioners, through counsel, filed a Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. This Court granted the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari as to the following issues: 
1. Whether trespassing may constitute a public use 
pursuant to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-
5-104. 
2. Whether the district court erred in its 
determination that the public had continuously used the 
road at issue in this case according to the requirements 
of the Dedication Statute. 
3. Whether the district court failed to designate a 
specific ten-year period of continuous use and, if so, 
whether that failure constituted reversible error. 
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in its 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 73-7-104(4) to the facts 
of this case. 
See Order, dated March 15, 2007, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The district court and the court of appeals erred by 
determining that trespassers are members of the "public" for 
purposes of satisfying the Dedication Statute. According to the 
record on appeal in the instant case, a substantial number of the 
governments' witnesses utilized at trial were trespassers on 
6 
Petitioners' property. By refusing to apply common law trespass 
to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104, the district court and the court of appeals misinterpreted 
the requisite elements underlying the Dedication Statute. Because 
the use by trespassers is based upon wrongful conduct and a lack 
of good faith, equitable principles and sound public policy 
dictate that they are not members of the public for purposes of 
the Dedication Statute. 
2. The district court and the court of appeals erred by 
determining that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare as required by the Dedication Statute. 
Use of the Bennie Creek Road^was interrupted^-by naturally 
p. J [?)' 
occurring conditions, locked gau^s^cn the road, trespassing signs, 
a bog resulting from spring water and ditches, and the flow of 
irrigation water on the road. 
The district court misinterpreted the Dedication Statute and 
misapplied the underlying legal principles of the statute 
pertaining to the elements of "continuous use" as a "public 
thoroughfare" when it determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in 
continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare. Moreover, 
the court of appeals erred by basing its conclusion upon that of 
the district court, which failed to consider that the 
7 
aforementioned circumstances precluded the public from accessing 
the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary. 
3. Both the trial court and the court of appeals erred by 
determining that the Dedication Statute does not require a 
specific ten-year period of continuous use. By refusing to 
specifically identify the ten-year period, the district court both 
misinterpreted and misapplied the Dedication Statute. The court 
of appeals, in turn, refused to enforce the speciEic ten-year 
period of time. By so doing, the court of appeals affirmed the 
district court's impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to 
Petitioners, as landowners. This failure further ignored the 
presumption to be employed in favor of the Petitioners, as 
landowners. The trial court's refusal to pinpoint the requisite 
ten-year period of time of continuous use was an impermissible 
effort to shift the burden of such a determination to the court of 
appeals, as a depository in which the burden and determination is 
then to be performed. 
4. The court of appeals erred by determining that the 
statutory damages provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 are 
automatic, and that the district court has no discretion in 
awarding such damages. A position that statutory damages are 
automatic with no discretion to be exercised by the district court 
is contrary to the plain language of the statute, where the 
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Legislature utilized the permissive term "may" throughout various 
subsections of the statute. 
Adopting the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute 
requires the insertion of the mandatory term "shall" into the 
statute, which is contrary to the legislative intent of the 
statute. By employing the permissive term "may" in contrast to 
the compulsory term "shall", the Legislature specifically intended 
and thereby enabled the court to exercise discretion in awarding 
the statutory damages provided for in the statute. 
The district court exercised its discretion in the instant 
case by considering various factors surrounding the metal gate. 
An interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 that enables the 
district court to exercise discretion in awarding damages is 
consistent with this being a case in equity. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 
BY DETERMINING THAT TRESPASSERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE 
"PUBLIC" FOR PURPOSES OF SATISFYING THE DEDICATION 
STATUTE. 
A, The Dedication Statute and Related Legal 
Principles• 
According to the Dedication Statute, which is set forth at 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001) , "A highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously 
9 
used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). Because private property is 
constitutionally protected,3 "[t]he law does not lightly allow the 
transfer of property from private to public use." Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). 
Consistent with the constitutional protection that private 
property enjoys, the government's taking of property in 
circumstances such as the instant case ''requires proof of 
dedication by clear and convincing evidence."4 Id. (citing 
Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 130, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972); 
Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 377-78, 438 P.2d 545, 548 
(1968)). "This higher standard of proof is demanded since the 
ownership of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity 
and respect." Id. (citing Petersen, 438 P. 2d at 548-4 9 (Crockett, 
C.J., dissenting)). 
Additionally, "'[t]he presumption is in favor of the property 
owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required 
3According to the Utah Constitution, "Private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." See 
Utah Const, art. I, § 2 2 . Moreover, the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides, "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation." See U.S. Const, 
amend. V. 
4The clear and convincing evidence standard requires "clear, 
explicit, and unequivocal evidence" that is "sufficiently strong to 
command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." See 9A 
Am.Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms Evidence § 140 (2005). 
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period of time is on those claiming it.'" Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. 
v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) (quoting 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, "xthe highway, even though it be 
over privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned 
to the public use when the public has continuously used it as a 
thoroughfare for a period of 10 years, jbut such use must be by the 
public.'" Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 345, 273 P.2d 720, 
723 (1954) (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P. 
1127, 1131 (1916) (emphasis added)). 
Finally, dedication and abandonment cases are cases in 
equity. Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 
1977) . Consequently, this Court is not bound to recognize 
findings or determinations that are contrary to the evidence. Jd. 
B. Sound Public Policy Dictates that Trespassers 
Are Not Members of the Public for Purposes of 
Dedication and Abandonment of Private 
Property for the Public Use. 
According to the record on appeal in the instant case, a 
substantial number of the governments' witnesses utilized at trial 
were trespassers on Petitioners' property (see, e.g., R. 
1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 
1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-
17; R. 1642:709:16). The Petitioners, as landowners, among other 
11 
ttftf* \ (^ things, diligently posted "no trespassing" signs (see, e.g., id.), 
T placed gates across the road (see, e.g., R. 1642:710:18), and 
U ^ Q 1 called the county sheriff to have trespassers removed (see, e.g., 
R. 1645:1073:11-17). 
Pursuant to common law trespass, "[t]he essential element of 
trespass is physical invasion of the land; '[t]respass is a 
possessory action.'" Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 
P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John Price Assocs., Inc. v. 
Utah State Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 
1214 (Utah 1980) and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 
(1977)); see also Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984). 
Trespass is a "wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of another." 
See O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 38 Utah 475, 479, 114 
P. 127, 128 (1911). 
The totality of the aforementioned circumstances demonstrates 
that most of the witnesses utilized by Utah County and the State 
were trespassers. As such, those witnesses should not and did not 
constitute members of the public for purposes of establishing 
dedication and abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public 
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. By refusing to apply 
common law trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, the district court and the court of 
12 
appeals misinterpreted the requisite elements underlying the 
Dedication Statute. 
In its opinion, the court of appeals concluded that 
Petitioners' 
proposed interpretation would render the 
Dedication Statute ineffective because no use 
could ever constitute public use. To give the 
Dedication Statute proper effect, we hold that 
nonpermissive use must be considered public use. 
We therefore agree with the trial court that 
trespassers are members of the "public" for 
purposes of determining whether the Dedication 
Statute has been satisfied. 
Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, Kll, 147 P. 3d 963 
(citation omitted). The reasoning of the court of appeals is 
seriously flawed inasmuch as it equates nonpermissive use as one 
and same with trespassing. Cf. Chapman v. Uintah County, 2003 UT 
App 383, f2, 81 P.3d 761 (noting testimony of public use of road 
year-around, without permission and without encountering 
restrictions). Dedication and abandonment of private property to 
the public use is established when a highway or road is 
continuously used by members of the public as a public 
thoroughfare for the requisite period of time. This implies good 
faith use of the highway by the public. Trespassers are not good 
faith users, rather they come to the court with unclean hands 
based upon their wrongful conduct of invading another's property. 
See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 
13 
1995) (distinguishing between members of the general public and 
those considered to be trespassers); accord Vaughn v. Williams, 
345 So.2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 350 So.2d 896 
(La. 1977) (holding that public authority is precluded from taking 
road unless landowner knowingly acquiesced in public use and 
maintenance, amounting to tacit dedication by landowner). 
The court of appeals' decision, if allowed to stand, would 
reward the lawless and wrongful conduct of trespassing upon 
another's property and, in turn, penalize a landowners diligent 
efforts to protect his or her property within the parameters of 
the law. Such a result is contrary to the equitable principles 
underlying the instant case. See Park v. Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 
364 P.2d 1, 3 (1961) (recognizing that a plaintiff must come to 
equity with clean hands). "In other words, a party who seeks an 
equitable remedy must have acted in good faith and not in 
violation of equitable principles." Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 
241, %1, 95 P.3d 1221. Because the use by trespassers is based 
upon wrongful conduct and a lack of good faith, equitable 
principles and public policy dictate that they are not members of 
the public for purposes of the Dedication Statute. 
C. By Refusing to Apply Trespass Principles, the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals 
Impermissibly Relieved Utah County and the 
State of Their Burden and Ignored the 
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Presumption to be Employed in Favor of 
Property Owners. 
The well-established legal principles underlying the 
dedication and abandonment statute dictate that Utah County and 
the State had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that those traveling the Bennie Creek Road were not trespassers. 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P. 2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1995); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). By refusing to apply common law trespassing 
principles to the requisite elements of dedication, the district 
court and the court of appeals impermissibly relieved Utah County 
and the State of their burden to prove dedication by clear and 
convincing evidence; thereby shifting the burden to Petitioners, 
as landowners, to prove otherwise. Further, the refusal by the 
district court and the court of appeals to apply the law of 
trespass ignored the well-established presumption to be employed 
in favor of property owners, which is to be applied due to the 
high-degree of sanctity and respect of property ownership. Cf. 
Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099; Campbell, 962 P.2d at 808. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 
BY DETERMINING THAT THE BENNIE CREEK ROAD HAD BEEN 
CONTINUOUSLY USED AS A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE DEDICATION STATUTE. 
Before a private road can be taken and dedicated for public 
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, three elements must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence: "'there must be (i) 
continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
of ten years.'" Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997)). The "continuous use" element is 
properly established if the public "made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient or 
necessary." Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P. 2d 107, 109 
(1958). "[U]se may be continuous though not constant . . . . 
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or 
chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Richards 
v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) (citation 
omitted and emphasis added). In sum, "under the continuous use 
requirement, members of the public must have been able to use the 
road whenever they found it necessary or convenient." Campbell, 
962 P.2d at 809. 
In the instant case, the district court acknowledged that use 
of the Bennie Creek Road was interrupted "by naturally occurring 
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conditions such as groundwater (spring water) in wet years and 
snow in the winter." (R. 1470). The district court also conceded 
that witnesses at trial testified "that there were locked gates on 
the road." (R. 1469). In fact, the district court readily 
acknowledged that "[t]here was testimony regarding four gates on 
the Benny [sic] Creek road between U.S. Highway 89 and the Uintah 
National Forest." (R. 1465) (Emphasis added). The district court 
further stated, "Virgil Neeves testified that between 1958 and 
1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner home (the last home 
traveling west toward the forest service property, now occupied by 
[Petitioner] Randy Butler) which was locked most of the time." (R. 
1467-68).5 
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court specifically 
noted that Mr. Mike Condley, who had lived in the area from 1970 
until 1979, "firmly recalled a locked gate near the Gardner 
(Butler) home." (R. 1468). Shortly thereafter, by way of its 
Decision, the district court also acknowledged that "Defendant 
Blaine Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near 
5The district court also noted that Mr. Neeves "saw people stuck 
on the road and recalls a cable across the road to stop cars." 
Without explanation, the district court refused to consider this 
testimonial evidence, deeming it as "simply confused and inconsistent 
with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the road in 
question." (R. 1468) . 
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the present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest 
service property." (R. 1467). 
The district court, in addition to the gates, conceded that 
<^ 7 \ there "was substantial testimony about ["no trespassing"] signs 
along the road" and other locations "designating the area as 
private property." (R. 1466; see also R. 1639:39:7-12; R. 
1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; R. 
1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-17; R. 
1642:709:16). Moreover, Petitioners, as landowners, called the 
county sheriff to have various individuals removed from their 
f) property, as trespassers (see, e.g., R. 1645:1073:11-17; see also 
R. 1466). 
Travel by way of the Bennie Creek Road to the Forest Service 
land was not only interrupted but precluded by what was commonly 
referred to as a bog in the road, which was the result of springs 
or ditches (R. 1462) . According to the record, this bog made 
travel on the Bennie Creek Road difficult, if not impossible, 
during ''certain seasons or certain times between 1925 and 1980" 
(R. 1462). 
Additionally, unrebutted testimony provided at trial 
established that the road "is periodically used to deliver 
irrigation water to property along the road and that when that 
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occurs, the road becomes impassable." (R. 1466).6 The testimony 
established that the road was used from 1950 through 1993 as the 
irrigation ditch to transport water to the property owners' 
pastures on both sides of the road (R. 1644:944:17-25; R. 
1644:970:6-9). According to the testimony at trial, "about every 
three weeks" the road would be utilized for irrigation purposes 
"[f]or approximately six days" at a time (R. 1644:974:11-20). 
With total disregard for the foregoing, the district court 
found that "neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) 
families used that method or irrigation covering a period from 
1925 to 1981." (R. 1466; R. 1518, 1fl8). Ordinarily, to 
successfully challenge a finding, the appellant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the finding[] and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's finding[] [is] so lacking 
in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). There is no 
evidence to marshal in support of the district court's finding. 
As a result, in light of the aforementioned testimony and 
citations to the record, the trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous. 
6The irrigation practices of the landowners were performed 
pursuant to "diligence rights" established in 1850 (R. 1645:1093:1-
4) . 
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The district court misinterpreted the Dedication Statute and 
misapplied the underlying legal principles of the statute 
pertaining to the elements of "continuous use" as a "public 
thoroughfare" when it determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in 
continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare. Moreover, 
the court of appeals erred by basing its conclusion upon that of 
the district court, which failed to consider that the 
aforementioned circumstances precluded the public from accessing 
the road "as often as they found it convenient or necessary." See 
AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, 111, 112 P.3d 1228. 
III. BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE DEDICATION STATUTE 
DOES NOT REQUIRE A SPECIFIC TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF 
CONTINUOUS USE. 
The Dedication Statute requires continuous use by the public 
for ten years before private property can be dedicated or 
abandoned to the public use. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(2001); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). The district court failed to specifically identify 
such a ten-year period of time, which determination the court of 
appeals affirmed. 
The district court in the instant case concluded that "the 
evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior 
to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as often as 
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necessary or convenient . . . ." (R. 1470). In the course of its 
decision, the district court stated that 
even if it is concluded (which this Court 
does not) that the road was gated and locked 
in the late 50's and early 60's as described 
by the Butlers, the road was used as 
necessary and convenient by the public for 
more than 10 years before that time and, 
again, 10 years after that time. 
(R. 1461; see also R. 1515, 1(28) . 
In Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P. 2d 1097 (Utah 
1995), Draper City and several individuals, as plaintiffs, brought 
an action seeking declaration that a private road had been 
dedicated and abandoned to public use on the ground that it had 
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of 
ten years. Id. at 1098. The trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs, which the defendants appealed. Id. 
On appeal, this Court stated that "neither [plaintiffs], the 
trial court in its findings, nor we have been able to pinpoint any 
ten-year period during which public use, as we have defined it, of 
the full length of the road is undisputed. Continuous use for ten 
years is required by section 27-12-89 [the predecessor statute to 
Utah Code Ann. 72-5-104]." Id. at 1100. Consequently, this Court 
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent 
with its opinion. Id. at 1101. 
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Likewise, the district court in this case failed to 
specifically pinpoint the requisite ten-year period of time, which 
the court of appeals affirmed. By refusing to specifically 
identify the ten-year period, the district court both 
misinterpreted and misapplied the Dedication Statute. The court 
of appeals, in turn, refused to enforce a specific ten-year period 
of time. In so doing, the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court's impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to 
Petitioners, as landowners. Cf. Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine 
Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) (quoting Bonner v. 
Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)). This 
failure also ignored the presumption to be employed in favor of 
the Petitioners, as landowners. Id. The trial court's refusal to 
pinpoint the requisite ten-year period of time of continuous use 
was an impermissible effort to shift the burden of such a 
determination to the court of appeals, as a depository in which 
the burden and deteermination is then to be performed. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE 
STATUTORY DAMAGES PROVIDED FOR IN UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 72-7-104 ARE AUTOMATIC, AND THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURT HAS NO DISCRETION IN AWARDING SUCH DAMAGES. 
In its cross-appeal to the court of appeals, Utah County 
challenged the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to 
statutory damages for the time period during which a metal gate 
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remained across the road after notice. The court of appeals 
misinterpreted and misapplied Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 in the 
course of reversing the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) provides: 
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, 
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains 
any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, 
conduit, sewer, ditch culvert, outdoor advertising 
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind 
or character within the right-of-way of any 
highway without complying with this title, the 
highway authority having jurisdiction over the 
right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-
of way or require the person, firm, or 
corporation to remove the installation; or 
(b) give written notice to the person, 
firm, or corporation to remove the 
installation from the right-of-way. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) (2001) (emphasis added).7 
Subsection (4) further provides that u [a] highway authority may 
recover: (1) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the 
installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; 
and (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the 
right-of-way after notice was complete." See Utah Code Ann. § 72-
7-104(4) (2001) (emphasis added). 
The appellate court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes 
is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
7A true and correct copy of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001) is 
attached hereto as Addendum E. 
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plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve." Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, Ull, 100 P.3d 
1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the course of 
interpreting a statute, the appellate court "presume[s] that the 
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term 
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 
1999 UT 35, 1(9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Furthermore, the appellate court "read[s] the plain language of 
the statute as a whole, and interpret [s] its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^17, 66 P.3d 592. Only when a 
statute is ambiguous do we look to other interpretive tools such 
as legislative history. See Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ^8, 108 
P.3d 725. 
In the course of reversing the district court, the court of 
appeals held that the district court "did not have discretion to 
deny statutory damages" pursuant to the statute. Utah County v. 
Butler, 2006 UT App 444, f21, 147 P.3d 963. Such a position is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute, where the 
Legislature utilized the permissive term "may" throughout various 
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subsections of the statute.8 See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1), 
(4) , and (5) (b) . 
Adopting the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute 
requires the insertion of the mandatory term "shall" into the 
statute, which is contrary to the legislative intent of the 
statute. By employing the permissive term "may" in contrast to 
the compulsory term "shall", the Legislature specifically intended 
and thereby enabled the court to exercise discretion in awarding 
the statutory damages provided for in the statute. Such an 
interpretation does not render the statute superfluous or 
inoperative, rather it provides the district court with the 
discretion to more fully consider the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the structure. 
The district court exercised its discretion in the instant 
case by considering various factors surrounding the metal gate. 
For example, in its decision, the district court noted that for 
some time since construction of the gate the road had been and had 
not been obstructed, and that " [n] o evidence was presented to 
clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the 
road was obstructed and how many were not." (R. 1459). 
Consequently, the district court determined that Utah County, as 
8See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, flO, 150 P.3d 540 (discussing 
the permissive term "may" in contrast to the compulsory term "shall" 
in the course of statutory interpretation). 
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the moving party, failed to meet its "burden of providing specific 
evidence of the number of days the Defendants have been in 
violation." (R. 1458). 
The district court also exercised its discretion by taking 
into consideration the fact that Utah County, itself, placed a 
sign on the gate, which reads, "KEEP GATE CLOSED - PRIVATE 
PROPERTY TO FOREST SERVICE BOUNDARY - NO TRESPASSING OFF ROAD." 
(R. 1648: Defendants' Exhibit 80C. -- Photo of Utah County's 
Sign)9 Utah County's placement of the sign demonstrates, at the 
very least, acquiescence in installation of the gate not to 
mention its closure across the road. 
An interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 that enables 
the district court to exercise discretion in awarding damages is 
consistent with this being a case in equity. See Richards v. 
Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P. 2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) . " [E] quity cases 
afford courts discretion and latitude in fashioning equitable 
remedies." Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, [^24, 89 P. 3d 148. "A 
court acting in equity is not required to recite its decision in 
terms of specific factors or to adhere to formulaic tests. 
Rather, its obligation is to effectuate a result that serves 
9Utah County stipulated that it had placed the sign on the closed 
gate (R. 1645:1139-40). A true and correct copy of Defendants' 
Exhibit 80C is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
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equity given the overall facts and circumstances of the individual 
case." Jd. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully ask that 
this Court reverse both the court of appeals' determination that 
the Bennie Creek Road was abandoned and dedicated to the public 
use and the conclusion that Utah County was automatically entitled 
to statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. Petitioners 
further request that the Court, in the course of its reversal, 
issue a clear and concise statement of the requisite legal 
principles and elements for dedication and abandonment of a 
private road to the public use as well as principles governing 
§ 72-7-104 damages for failing to remove an installation within 
the right-of-way of a highway. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of May, 2007. 
ARNOXJD W WIGGINS , P . C . 
Scott LJWig^rlns 
*kb&o&¥tgys r©*JPetitioners 
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Tab A 
RIGHTS-OF-WAY 72-5-104 
(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under joint title as 
provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-of-way described in Title 72, 
Chapter 5, Part 3, Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all 
interests in real property less than fee simple held under this section is 
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town holding the interest. 
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the 
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101; 1991, ch. 
137, § 29; C. 1953, 27-12-101; renumbered 
by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 131; 2000, ch. 324, § 6; 
2001, ch. 79, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-101, and added new Subsection (1), mak-
ing related changes in subsection designation. 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 
2000, added Subsection (2Kb), making a related 
change. 
The 2001 amendment, effective March 9, 
2001, added Subsections (2)(a)(ii) and (2)(a)(iii) 
and the (2)(aXi) designation and substituted 
"transportation purposes" for "highway pur-
poses" in Subsections (1) and (2)(a)(i). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Rights of public and abutting owners. 
Vacation of road. 
Cited 
Rights of public and abutting owners. 
Erection of electric power lines on public 
highway right-of-way, the fee to which is not in 
the public but in the owner of the abutting 
property, is within the purview of the easement 
for highway purposes and is not an additional 
servitude for which the abutting owner is en-
titled to compensation. Pickett v. California 
Pac. Utils., 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980). 
Statutes regulating water mains in relation 
to highways clearly indicated that legislature 
did not regard dedication of a street in a platted 
subdivision as the surrender of an easement 
with retention of the fee in the abutting owner. 
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 
210(1952). 
Vacation of road. 
When city vacated street property which was 
never used by the public and never platted as a 
street on the official records, the parties owning 
the land abutting on either side of such prop-
erty were entitled to fee simple interests to the 
center line of the "street," because the grantor 
who deeded the street property to the city was 
also the grantor of the abutting landowners, 
and no intention to the contrary appeared in 
any of the original deeds. Fenton v. Cedar 
Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 R2d 
966 (1965). 
Property developers' dedication of land for 
public rights-of-way in a plat of a subdivision 
gave a defeasible fee interest to the county in 
the land dedicated for the road and, once the 
county vacated the road, the abutting property 
owner succeeded to the fee simple title of that 
land. Falula Farms, Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 
569 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Cited in Nelson v. Provo City, 2000 UT App 
205, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 20. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur 2d Highways, 
Streets, and Bridges § 183. 
C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 136. 
72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication — Scope. 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it 
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the 
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
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(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary 
to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, * 89; C. 1953, 
27-12-89; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, 2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed t ' 
* 132; 2000, ch. 324, k 7. have been" m Subsection (1) and added Subs J ? 
tions (2) and (3) Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-89 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16 
2med to 
Subsec-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Acceptance 
Burden of proof 
Change in highway 
Control by landowners 
Estoppel 
Evidence 
Generally 
Intent of landowner 
—Necessary 
—Not necessary 
Private rights 
"Public" defined 
Rights granted to public 
Rights of subsequent grantees 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication 
"Thoroughfare" and "public thoroughfare" dis-
tinguished 
Width of roadway 
Acceptance. 
When owner of land deeded it to city for 
public use but city never accepted it, no dedica-
tion took place and claim of purchaser from city 
was invalid as against subsequent purchaser 
from original owner of land William J Lemp 
Brewing Co v P J Moran, Inc , 51 Utah 178, 
169 P 459 (1917) 
Burden of proof. 
Where claim is made that a highway has 
been dedicated to public use, there is a pre-
sumption in favor of the property owner and 
the burden of establishing public use for the 
required period of time is on those claiming it 
Leo M Bertagnole, Inc v Pine Meadow 
Ranches, 639 P2d 211 (Utah 1981) 
Change in highway. 
A public highway over public lands is estab 
hshed, although there has been no official ac-
ceptance, when it has been used for longer than 
ten years, if travel has remained substantially 
unchanged, and practical identity of road pre-
served, that is sufficient, although there may 
have been slight deviations from the common 
way Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co v 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P 646 (1929) 
Slight change m course of highway or of its 
location that does not materially change or 
affect the general course thereof or affect its 
location, nor break or change the continuity of 
travel or use, does not constitute abandonment 
or affect public nature of highway Sullivan v 
Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P 954 (1930) 
Control by landowners. 
No dedication was shown under identically 
worded predecessoi section where it appeared 
that an alleyway which had more or less been 
used by the public at will for a number of years 
had from time to time been closed by the 
abutting ow ners, who had at all times exercised 
control over it Culmer v Salt Lake City, 27 
Utah 252, 75 P 620(1904) 
Estoppel. 
Municipality may be estopped from asserting 
dedication by acts and conduct that have been 
relied on by others to their prejudice and, 
likewise, private individual may be estopped in 
the same way where he stands by and permits 
others to improve land claimed to have been 
dedicated Premium Oil Co v Cedar City, 112 
Utah 324, 187 P2d 199 (1947) 
Evidence. 
Evidence showing, among other things, that 
roadway was used continuously for recreational 
and agricultural purposes and for access to 
other business activities supported the trial 
courts ruling that the roadway was dedicated 
or abandoned to the public Kohler v Martin, 
916 P2d 910 (Utah Ct App 1996) 
Generally. 
Where all three elements under this section 
for the establishment of a public highway were 
satisfied, the court had no discretion to ignore 
that fact and erred in concluding that a road 
was not a public highway Heber City Corp v. 
Simpson, 942 P2d 307 (Utah 1997) 
Intent of landowner. 
—Necessary. _•« 
In order for a private road to become a puwjj 
thoroughfaie there must be evidence o( intOT 
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by the owner to dedicate the road to a public 
use and an acceptance by the public. Such 
intent may be inferred from declarations, acts 
or circumstances and use by the general public. 
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426 
(1964) (but see cases noted under "—Not nec-
essary" below). 
For cases discussing landowner's intent to 
dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull, 
7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 (1890); Whittaker v. 
Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); 
Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 
(1901); Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 
75 P. 620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line 
R.R., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Morris v. 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243,161 P. 1127 (1916); William 
J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51 
Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v. 
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923). 
—Not necessary. 
The determination that a roadway has been 
continuously used by members of the general 
public for at least ten years is the sole require-
ment for it to become a public road; it is not 
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer 
the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 
R2d 447 (Utah 1981). 
l b establish a dedication of a road to a public 
use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's 
intent to dedicate the road to a public use. Leo 
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 
639 P2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
Private rights. 
Creation of a private right in a public thor-
oughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in 
conflict with the dedication of land to the use of 
the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 
910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
"Public* defined. 
Owners of property abutting or straddling 
rural road and their personal visitors were not 
members of public generally within this provi-
sion; burden of proving real public use of that 
road continuously for ten years was not met in 
suit by subdividers who sought to establish 
that the road had become a public thorough-
fare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 
P.2d 545 (1968). 
Rights granted to public. 
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under 
Ibwnsite Act (43 U.S.C § 718 et seq , now 
repealed), after alleged dedication thereof as 
public street, so that only right that public 
could have acquired would be right to easement 
across strip for traveling purposes, and only 
additional right contiguous property owners 
n^ght acquire would be right of ingress to and 
egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v. 
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
Rights of subsequent grantees. 
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway 
and is accepted by public as such, all subse-
quent grantees of abutting lands are bound by 
dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 
P. 955(1901). 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication. 
Highway over privately owned ground will be 
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public 
use when the public has continuously used it as 
a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Morris 
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916). 
For cases finding sufficient evidence to sup-
port finding of dedication to public use, see 
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 
(1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 
P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 
326 P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 
2d 212, 341 P2d 424 (1959). 
Mere use by public of private alley in common 
with owners of alley does not show a dedication 
thereof to public use, or vest any right in public 
to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 
273 P2d 720 (1954). 
Though dedication of one's land to public use 
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow, 
private dead-end street was used by neighbor-
ing residents and the general public without 
interference for at least 25 years, and where the 
city had platted it as a public street in 1915 and 
had thereafter paved it and maintained a pub-
lic street sign at its entrance, and where plain-
tiff who owned the fee simple interest in the 
land on which the street was situated had not 
paid any taxes on the street property for 25 
years, this combination of factors was sufficient 
to justify finding that the street had been 
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 
Utah 2d 140, 417 P2d 646 (1966). 
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of 
proof is required for the establishment of a 
public thoroughfare or taking of another's prop-
erty. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 
P.2d 639 (1972). 
Where the trial court found that public had 
used north-south road for 12 years and that 
during this time, the road was ten feet wide, 
anu1 the court found that there was insufficient 
use of an east-west road by the public to make 
it a public road, these findings of fact, sup-
ported by substantial evidence, compelled a 
holding that the north-south road was a public 
highway ten feet wide and that no public high-
way existed on the east-west road. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jack-
son Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) 
Because there were material issues of fact as 
to whether people using a road were members 
of the general public or landowners in the area, 
who had either a private right or permission to 
use the road, and there were conflicting state-
ments as to public use of the road for recre-
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ational purposes, summary judgment in favor 
of the proponents of dedication was erroneous. 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 p2d 
1097 (Utah 1995). 
finding tAat a roacf was not a pudYic thor-
oughfare was proper based on evidence that the 
road was generally used only during the <j e e r 
hunting season and was frequently closer to 
the public at other times, and that its
 u s e 
during the hunting season was by permission of 
the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County 9(32 
P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
"Thoroughfare" and "public thorough, 
fare" dist inguished. 
Under identically worded predecessor
 s e c . 
tion, a "thoroughfare" was a place or
 w a v 
through which there is passing or travel, i t 
ANALYSIS 
Abutting owners' rights. 
Bridges. 
Notice of abandonment required. 
Platted but unused streets. 
Power of cjty to abandon. 
Requisites for abandonment. 
Abutting owners' rights. 
While public may abandon street or h i g h w a v 
insofar as it affects rights of public the^ e j n 
such abandonment, however, will not affect 
rights of abutting owner with respect to u^ e 0f 
easement for ingress and egress to and fror^
 n i s 
premises. Hague v. Juab County Mill & E} e v a _ 
tor Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910). 
Whara pr&paAy Js st?)d with rafarapaa £0 a 
map or plat showing it to abut on a public 
highway, this constitutes an implied cover i a nt 
that highway will not be obstructed or inter-
fered with by grantor. While highway by al^an_ 
donment may pass out of jurisdiction of l o c a i 
became a "public thoroughfare"' when the public 
acquired a general right of passage. Morris v 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916). 
Width of roadway. 
Although there was some incidental evidence 
in the record regarding the width of the road in 
question, it was not error for the district court 
to refuse to determine the width of the road 
when that issue was not the focus of the litiga-
tion. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 
(Utah 1995). 
Generally, the width of a public road is deter-
mined according to what is reasonable and 
necessary under all the facts and circum-
stances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P2d 910 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
authorities, rights of abutting owners will not 
be affected. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 
126 P. 959 (1912). 
Bridges. 
Bridge owned by county was an essential 
part of road and could not be abandoned except 
as provided by statute. Adney v. State Rd. 
Comm'n, 67 Utah 567, 248 P. 811 (1926). 
Notice of abandonment required. 
County commissioners may not order aban-
donment of a county road unless notice thereof 
is given. Ercanbrack v Judd, 524 P2d 595 
(Utah 1974).' 
Platted but unused s t r ee t s . 
Corporation was able to give good tit)e to 
land platted for streets and alleyways but 
never used as such, since under proviso in 
former law, road not used or worked for nvr 
years ceased to be a highway. Mallory 
Taggart, 24 Utah 2d 267, 470 P.2d 254 (1970). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highw a y s , C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 15. 
Streets, and Bridges § 24 et seq. 
72-5-105. Highways once established continue until aban-
doned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until 
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction 
over any highway, or by other competent authority. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90; C. 1^53> m e n t > effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
27-12-90; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. ^ 7 0 , this section, which formerly appeared as § 
8 1 3 3» 27-12-90, and made a stylistic change. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 am^n(}_ 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
(Q-lbt-al nppnty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, et. al, : 
Plaintiffs : Memorandum Decision 
vs. : Date: June 16,2004 
Randy Butler, et. al., : Case Number: 000403327* 
Defendants : Division VH: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court for trial on June 1,2004. The case continued through 
7 days of testimony concluding with closing arguments on June 15. The Court has taken the 
matter under advisement and now renders this Memorandum Decision. 
The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to determine that a route described as the Benny 
Creek Road is a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-5-104,1953 as 
amended.1 In addition, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise its equitable powers to restrain the 
Defendants from blocking the road from public use and declare a right of way along the road for 
the public, although it seems that a declaration that the route is a public highway would render a 
further declaration of a public right of way to be superfluous. The Plaintiffs also ask for damages 
of $10.00 per day since July 29,1997 when notice was provided to the Defendants that they were 
formerly 27-12-89, renumbered in 1998. The statute has 
remained substantially unchanged since first enacted by the 
Territorial Legislature in 1886, Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah, 1929). 
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improperly blocking a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-7-104 and an 
identical Utah County Ordinance (17-3-1-1). 
In a case such as this the Court is required to consider "reconstruction of historical facts 
concerning timing, nature, and the extent of public usage [Witnesses are required to dredge 
the recesses of their minds for aged memories," Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 at 912 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). Over 60 witnesses have testified in this trial recalling facts and circumstances from 
as early as 1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the 
witnesses, in the view of this Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an 
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared to 
pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than others. 
Public Highway 
Three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route to 
be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under U.C.A. section 72-5-
104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years. 
. • .Once the technical provisions of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is a 'public 
highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 
P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Heber Citv Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 at 310 
(Utah, 1997). There is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the 
public. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches. 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper 
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City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.2d 
445 at 449 (Utah 1981). 
Continuous Use 
Continuous use is established where the public has "made a continuous and uninterrupted 
use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary," Campbell. 962 P.2d at 809. 
The "use may be continuous though not constant,... provided it occurred as often as the 
claimant had occasion to chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id. at 809 (citing 
Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). 
In this case the evidence was that a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the 
"Birdseye Church" has extended west toward the Uintah National Forest since before the 
memory of any witness. An ariel photograph taken in 1949 clearly shows the road extending 
from the highway into the vicinity of the national forest. Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson 
both testified that their family owned the property now owned by Defendant Randy Butler 
(herinafter "Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along 
the road from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. Diuing that 
time the road was traveled often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict or deny 
access to the road to any members of the public. One witness for the Defendants, Lloyd Jackson, 
testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner property between 1947 and 1955. He also 
hunted in the area every year until 1965. He testified that his father "made arrangements" with 
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Mr. Gardner to move the sheep across the property on the way to the forest service property. The 
Defendant insists that this travel was, therefore, by permission. However, the witness did not 
participate in the discussion and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was 
apparent that the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the 
sheep to get into the cattle-the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and 
arrangements were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain 
permission to travel a road. Contrasted with that testimony are the statements by Duane Newitt, 
Ron Davis, Reneae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don 
Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher. All of these witnesses personally used the road for 
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping and sightseeing in the 1940fs and 50fs. None 
encountered locked gates or sought permission. None were ever prevented from traveling the 
road. Several, including Norris Dalton and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service 
property. 
There was testimony that travel was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the 
road were worse in wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle. Winter 
snow was not plowed off of this mountain road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and 
convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as 
often as necessary or convenient, interrupted only by naturally occurring conditions such as 
groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the winter. 
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Mr. Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler) recalled family hunting trips 
between 1958 and 1962 when family members accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt 
(Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a 
key before traveling up the road to camp just below the bog on property now owned by 
Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from 
approximately 1962 when, at age 7, he saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate 
and spotted a buck which he shot before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. 
Contrasted against this vivid and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. 
Only the Poulson family has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. 
Bamey Newitt and Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about 
a key are both deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on 
the Poulson property during that time was on a side road south off the Benny Creek road toward 
an old bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and 
hunted with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other 
witnesses testified that they traveled the road for a variety of purposes during that time and never 
encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to obtain 
permission from property owners to travel the road. 
Other witnesses testified for the Defendants that there were locked gates on the road. 
Virgil Neeves testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner 
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home (the last home traveling west toward the forest service property, now occupied by 
Defendant Randy Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock 
fight"2 up the road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys 
to the gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to 
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be 
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area was 
usually across country from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to work on 
water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the road and recalls a cable 
across the road to stop cars. His memories are simply confused and inconsistent with all of the 
other testimony about obstructions on the road in question. There is evidence of a cable across a 
side road belonging to the Poulson family. 
Mike Condley testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 1979. Although he does 
not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near the Gardner (Butler) home. 
However, no other witness corroborates this point and descriptions of locked gates by the Butler 
2
"Cockfights" are illegal contests between roosters bred and 
trained to fight typically involving wagering and serious threat 
of injury to the animals. Presently outlawed by U.C.A. section 
76-9-301(1)(e), the practice has been illegal in this State since 
at least 1898. The Revised Statutes of the State of Utah, 
January 1, 1898 section 4454 provided that "any person who shall 
keep or use any . . . fowl, or bird, for the purpose of fighting 
. . . and any person who shall be a party to or be present as a 
spectator at any such fighting . . . shall be adjudged guilty of 
a misdemeanor." 
Page 6 of 18 
9,01 
family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the present 
cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service property. 
Finally Elizabeth Condley testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates were never 
locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her testimony was 
that she traveled the road on horseback during the summer. There was nothing given to explain 
how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall. 
The heaviest use of the property was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season. 
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 and 
never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the road. Division of 
Wildlife Resources officers Gurley and Briggs both patrolled the area to check hunters during 
that period. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 and 1991 sometimes observing as 
many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who had traveled up the Benny Creek road to 
hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never needed permission to access the 
area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby, Forest Service supervisor, routinely 
traveled the road during the 60's and 70fs. Entrance to the forest service during that time was 
marked by signs. 
Shirlene Otteson testified that her family purchased the Gardner property in 1964 and 
owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property with her husband and 
children. The road was considered and treated by her family as a public road during that time. 
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No attempt was made to close the road during that time. There was testimony that one defense 
witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Ms. Otteson's father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and 
leave the property. However he testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no 
adult. He was hunting well off the road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering 
teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the road. 
There was testimony that the road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road becomes impassable. However, 
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation, 
covering a period from 1925 to 1981. 
There was substantial testimony about signs along the road. The Defendants have 
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the road, coupled with posts painted yellow 
and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs* witnesses testified 
that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the road but not a warning 
against traveling on the road. The evidence was that the signs were placed on various locations 
along the edge of the road west of the Gardner home and, in particular, around a wire gate in the 
vicinity of a present cattle guard. 
Utah Code Annotated section 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property 
owners to restrict hunter access to their property by posting: 
"Properly posted" means that '*No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 square 
inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are displayed at all 
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corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates, and rights-of-way 
entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire exterior side must be 
painted." 
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the 
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would have 
to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of private 
property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a 
fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly 
indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can 
be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what the plaintiffs' witnesses 
assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road. 
There was testimony regarding four gates on the Benny Creek road between U.S. 
Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate 
location is near the Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one 
witness described the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never 
locked. All testified and assumed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict 
general travel on the road. 
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire 
gate, most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. 
These witnesses assumed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not 
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intended to restrict travel on the road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was 
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by Barney 
Newitt in the late 50fs and early 60fs. Remnants of the gate still exist, including a weathered 
piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too skimpy and too 
removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public travel particularly in 
the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the road and recalled no locks or road 
restrictions. 
There was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient 
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the road. One witness testified that the 
gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole 
described as the remnants of the bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed 
by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the road on all seasons between 1925 
and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property. There has been a sign 
indicating the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property 
has clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to 
"please close the gate."3 The obstruction was obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle 
3What was formerly a wire livestock gate has been replaced 
with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and 
livestock to move through the fence when required. The sign is 
presently on the metal gate. 
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and sheep, not people. 
It is established, by clear and convincing evidence that the road was in continuous use by 
the public. 
Public Thoroughfare 
The term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority 
defines the term as "a street or way opening at both ends into another street or public highway, so 
that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul de sac, which is 
open only at one end."4 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public use 
or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by many and 
different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all who desired to 
use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the situation and 
surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a public 
highway by public authority." 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384,285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929). 
The Court has also stated that a "'thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is 
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of 
passage." Gillmor v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280, 391 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964). 
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to 
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were 
4Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing 
Company, Cleveland: 1946. 
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reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a highway 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of course the 
Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Corner Canyon Road" 
could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, only that the issue 
could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a substantially different posture. 
This Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, the following facts about the 
Benny Creek road. The road or path connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest. 
Paths and trails from the top or terminus of the road travel over the mountain and connect to the 
Nebo Loop Road. During certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were 
springs or ditches which created bogs making travel through or around difficult or impossible. 
Nevertheless, there was regular maintenance performed on the road by Utah County, the United 
States Forest Service and landowners during that time. The road was graded as needed or 
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest 
service requiring them to maintain the road from 1974 through the present time. There was no 
evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense testified 
that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the Gardner home 
for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the road from the termination of 
oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year during the decades of 
the 60fs and 70's. The testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest 
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service and adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting 
(during the winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters, 
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and maintenance 
of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. Vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and 
motorcycles were all driven at various times the entire length of the road ending on forest service 
property. 
The Court concludes that the road was a public thoroughfare before 1980. 
10 years 
The statute specifies a 10 year period. This Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence 
that even if it is concluded (which this Court does not) that the road was gated and locked in the 
late 50fs and early 60's as described by the Butlers, the road was used as necessary and 
convenient by the public for more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that 
time. 
Reasonable and Necessary Width 
Having determined that the Benny Creek road was a public highway before 1980 by clear 
and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and necessary width of 
the highway, Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 at 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), U.C.A. Section 72-5-
104(3). The only testimony on this point was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified engineer and 
longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that a width of 20 feet 
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plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was reasonably necessary for 
anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the 
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side.5 
Injunction 
As noted above, the issuance of an injunction may be mooted by the determination that 
the road is a public highway. Nevertheless, it is the order of this Court that the Defendants 
refrain from blocking, locking or otherwise interfering with public access to the Benny Creek 
road. It should be noted that the determination expressed in this decision takes into account the 
occasional use of the road for transportation of irrigation water. While there was little or no 
evidence that the road was actually used in lieu of an irrigation pipe or ditch before 1980, the 
testimony was not controverted that with the present, improved condition of the road, the 
occasional presence of irrigation water on the road will not substantially interfere with public use 
5The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline 
of the road generated from a survey of the road itself was 
introduced intQ evidence. The description was challenged by 
counsel for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different 
township or range than the legal description of the Defendants' 
properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that 
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to 
establish their respective boundaries as the center of the 
roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary line 
agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this 
Court to determine if there is a conflict in the two positions or 
how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The Court 
merely determines, today, that the road as it presently exists is 
a public highway, 20 feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each 
side. 
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of the road. 
Fines 
U.C.A. section 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains a 
structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days of 
notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover:... (b) $10 for 
each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete." Notice to 
Mr. and Mrs. Butler was completed on July 29,1997. Calculated from 10 days after service to 
the date of thisdecision, 2,561 days have passed. 
Nevertheless, several factors must also be considered. There was testimony that a locked 
gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many 
people were unable to travel the road after that time without gaining permission or using a key 
provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one exhibit shows a gate created by the County 
which allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers to close the gate and 
stay on the road until arriving at the forest service. As noted above there have historically been 
gates across the road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is 
consistent with this pattern and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared 
today. Consequently, for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate the road 
has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify 
how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the road was obstructed and how many 
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were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the penalty, had the burden of 
providing specific evidence of the number of days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely 
showing initial service and testimony that persons were stopped from time to time during the last 
6 or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable 
precision the number of days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances 
existed no penally can be imposed. 
Costs of Court 
The Plaintiffs are, however, as the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable costs of 
court to be established by affidavit. 
Conclusion 
In this decision the Court has avoided reference to facts and circumstances after 1980. 
The Court is convinced by what it considers to be clear and convincing evidence that a public 
highway was established on the Benny Creek Road decades before the Butler, Evans or even 
Condley families ever came into possession of the property abutting the road. As a member of 
the public of this county, state and nation this Court is ashamed that these Defendants have had 
to suffer abuse at the hands of the general public. Their cattle have been stolen and killed. Their 
property has been littered. Their lives have been threatened. The distance from "the valley" 
gives a certain solitude and quiet peace equally attractive to the people who have made Birdseye 
their home, people who wish to enjoy the natural beauty as visitors and people who wish to 
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escape rules of behavior. Bullet holes in signs and beer cans and used syringes littering the 
landscape are not proud symbols of Utah and America. That said, it is also clear that other good 
and responsible people have used and cherished the area. It was obviously a particularly special 
place for the Newitt family. Grandchildren have caught their first fish in Benny Creek and 
dozens and dozens of hunters have relished a yearly visit to Deer Hollow-which was not 
accidentally named. 
It is the business of this Court, sitting in equity, to resolve the needs and desires of 
competing interests. The law properly demands great deference to private ownership and 
property rights. In this case, however, the evidence is clear and convincing that the road in 
question has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to a 
national highway for decades and generations. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and an 
order consistent with this decision. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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This matter came before the Court on a bench trial consisting of June 1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 
14th, and 15th, 2004. Plaintiff Utah County was represented by M. Cort Griffin and Robert J. Moore, 
Deputy Utah County Attorneys. Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, was represented by Martin B. Bushman, Assistant Utah 
Attorney General. Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and Donna Evans were 
represented by Mark E. Arnold and Scott Wiggins, of Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
The Court has reviewed the file, heard evidence at trial, issued a Memorandum Decision 
dated June 16, 2004, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings of fact based upon the clear and convincing evidence 
presented at trial, the admissions of Defendants, and the addition of the Butler Family Trust: 
1. That Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler are individuals residing in Utah County, 
Utah, and are the trustees and/or successor trustees of the Butler Family Trust dated the April 
11,2002, which is the owner of record of certain real properties more particularly described 
as follows: 
COM N 89 DEG 58'01"E ALONG SEC LINE 2661.78 FT FR NW COR 
SEC 26, T10S, R3E, SLM; S 89 DEG 29'48"E 402.48 FT; S 12 DEG 
07'30"W1083.73 FT; N 84 DEG 25'25"W 491.21 FT; N 86 DEG 46'28"W 
114.33 FT; S 77 DEG 44'11"W 78.72 FT; S 59 DEG 32'05"W 73.23 FT; S 
48 DEG 34'23"W 81.42 FT; S 66 DEG 14*50"W 60.21 FT; S 88 DEG 
10'49"W 73.18 FT; N 79 DEG 55*36"W 86.59 FT; N 20 DEG 49"W 444.56 
FT; N 13 DEG 12'01"W 265.17 FT; N 31 DEG 28'45"W 353.97 FT; N 61 
DEG 03'58"W 244.51 FT; N 16 DEG 47'16"W 346.47 FT; N 12 DEG 
28'38"W 368.34 FT; N 89 DEG 26*04"W 1047.86 FT; N 1 DEG 42'24"W 
672.01 FT; S 8 DEG 50'11"E 1330.15 FT; S 1 DEG 47'12"E 1315.76 FT; N 
89 DEG 58'01"E 1330.89 FT TO BEG. AREA 56.76 ACRES. 
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ALSO: COM SW COR SEC 23, T10S, R3E, SLM; N 1 DEG 42'24"W 
671.48 FT; S 89 DEG 26*04"E 1047.86 FT; S 12 DEG 28'38"E 368.34 FT; 
S 16 DEG 47'16"E 346.47 FT; S 61 DEG 03'58"E 244.51 FT; S 31 DEG 
28'45"E 353.97 FT; S 13 DEG 12'01"E 265.17 FT; S 20 DEG 00'49"E 444.56 
FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 30.66 FT; N 81 DEG 57'45"W 80 FT; N 77 DEG 
09'25"W 503.28 FT; S 83 DEG 57'05"W 131.47 FT; N 83 DEG 21'17"W 
364.54 FT; N 65 DEG 44'39"W 278.69 FT; N 55 DEG 47'09"W 218.59 FT; 
N 63 DEG 31'54"W 325.32 FT; N 587.40 FT TO BEG. AREA 50.30 
ACRES. 
ALSO: COM. AT NE COR OF SEC 27, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S 8.90 CHS; 
N 63 3/8 W 19.86 CHS; E 17.77 CHS TO BEG. AREA 7.81 ACRES. 
ALSO: SE1/4 OF SE1/4 OF SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM. AREA 40 
ACRES. 
2. That Defendants Blaine Evans and Linda Evans are individuals residing in Utah County, 
State of Utah, and are the owners of record of certain real properties more particularly 
described as follows: 
BEG. 10 CHS S OF NW COR OF SEC 26, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S TO THE 
TOP OF THE "GARDNER KNOLL" 19 CHS M OR 1; N-NE ALONG 
EXISTING FENCE LINE TO A PT S 63 E 8.65 CHS TO EXISTING COR 
POST; N 63 W 8.65 CHS M OR 1 TO BEG. AREA 8.22 ACRES M OR 1. 
ALSO: COM AT SW COR. SEC. 27, R10S, R3E, SLB&M.; N 0 DEG 
10*6"W 2651.35 FT; N 0 DEG 10'6"W 2651.35 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 
2640.89 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 1467.41 FT; S 63 DEG 23'0"E 1316.6 FT; 
S 0 DEG 21'14"E 2078.28 FT; S 0 DEG 21'14"E 1333.77 FT; N 89 DEG 
42'26"W 1323.7 FT; S 0 DEG 18'27"E 1331.74 FT; N 89 DEG 37'13"W 
1324.8 FT; N 89 DEG 37'13"W 2649.6 FT TO BEG. AREA 597.515 AC. 
ALSO: Sl/2 OF SW1/4 & SW1/4 OF SE1/4 OF SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, 
SLM. AREA 120 ACRES. 
ALSO: Nl/2 OF SW1/4 & Nl/2 OF SE 1/4 SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM. 
AREA 160 ACRES. 
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3. That the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter referred to as "Road") commences at or near 
Birdseye, Utah at a junction with U.S. Highway 89, located in Section 25, Township 10 
South, Range 3 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
4. That from the Road's junction with U.S. Highway 89, it continues approximately 2.5 miles 
in a westerly direction through Sections 25,26,27 and 22, Township 10 South, Range 3 East 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian until it reaches the western edge of the Uinta National Forest. 
5. That over 60 witnesses testified at trial recalling facts and circumstances from as early as 
1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the 
witnesses, in view of the Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an 
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared 
to pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than 
others. 
6. That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church" 
and has extended west toward the Uinta National Forest since before the memory of any 
witness. 
7. That an ariel photo taken in 1946 clearly shows the Road extending from the highway into 
the vicinity of the national forest. 
&. That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family owned the property 
now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter referred to as 
"Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road 
from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time 
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the Road was traveled by the public often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict 
or deny access to the Road to any members of the public. 
That Loyd Jackson, a defense witness, testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner 
property between 1947 and 1955. He also hunted in the area every year until 1965. He 
testified that his father "made arrangements" with Mr. Gardner to move sheep across the 
Gardner's property on the way to the forest service property. Defendants insist that this 
travel was, therefore, by permission. However, Mr. Jackson did not participate in the 
discussions and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was apparent that 
the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to 
get into the cattle, as the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and arrangements 
were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to 
travel the Road. 
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, 
Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the Road 
for recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in the 1940fs and 50's. 
None of them encountered locked gates on the Road or sought permission to use the Road. 
None of them were ever prevented from traveling the Road. Several, including Norris Dalton 
and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service property. 
That travel on the Road was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the Road were 
worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by 
foot, horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed off the Road. 
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Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the 
road wsis open and traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, interrupted 
vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions such as groundwater (spring water) 
in wet years and snow in the winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on 
foot, horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted. 
That Defendant Randy Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler), defense 
witnesses, recalled family hunting trips between 1958 and 1962 when family members 
accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt (Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's 
grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a key before traveling up the Road to 
camp just below the bog on the property now owned by Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. 
Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from approximately 1952 when, at age 7, he 
saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate and spotted a buck which he shot 
before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. Contrasted against this vivid 
and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. Only the Poulson family 
has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. Barney Newitt and 
Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about a key are both 
deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on the Poulson 
property during that time was on a side road branching south off the Road toward an old 
bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and hunted 
with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other 
witnesses testified that they traveled the Road for a variety of purposes during that time and 
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never encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to 
obtain permission from property owners to travel the Road. 
13. That Virgil Neeves, a defense witness, testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a 
cable gate across a cattle guard west of the Gardner home (the last home traveling west 
toward the forest service property, now occupied by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna 
Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock fight" up the 
Road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys to the 
gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to 
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be 
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area 
was usually across country from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to 
work on water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the Road and 
recalls a cable across a cattle guard on the Road to stop cars. His memories are simply 
confused and inconsistent with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the Road in 
question. Further, there is evidence of a cable across a side road belonging to the Poulson 
family, and a gate and cattle guard on the Road at the Forest Boundary. 
14. That Mike Condley, a defense witness, testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 
1979. Although he does not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near 
the Gardner (Butler) home. However, no other witness corroborates this point and 
descriptions of locked gates by the Butler family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put 
Page 7 of 20 
0 U 5 2 0 
locked gates farther west, near the present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest 
service property. 
15. That Elizabeth Condley, a defense witness, testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates 
were never locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her 
testimony was that she traveled the Road on horseback during the summer. There was 
nothing given to explain how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall. 
16. That the heaviest use of the Road was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season. 
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 
and never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the Road. 
Division of Wildlife Resources officer Gurley and Briggs patrolled the area to check hunters 
and fishermen from 1958 through 1996. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 
and 1991 sometimes observing as many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who 
had traveled up the Road to hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never 
needed permission to access the area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby, 
Forest Service supervisor, routinely traveled the Road during the 60's and 70fs for personal 
and professional purposes. Entrance to the forest service during that time was marked by 
signs. 
17. That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family purchased the Gardner 
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property 
with her husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her family as a 
public road during that time. No attempt was made to close the Road during that time. 
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There was testimony that one defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's 
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property. However, Mr. Mendenhall 
testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was 
hunting well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering teenagers 
to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the Road. 
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the Road and that when that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However, 
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation, 
covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and convincing majority of witnesses further 
traveled the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices. 
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road. The Defendants have 
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted 
yellow and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs' 
witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the 
Road but not a warning against traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were 
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the Gardner home to the 
forest boundary and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard. 
Members of the public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were 
at a property line or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing 
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is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless 
of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than 
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted 
posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs' witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel 
off of the Road, not on the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road 
Closed." 
That there was testimony regarding four gates on the Road between U.S. Highway 89 and 
the Uinta National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate location is near the 
Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one witness described 
the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never locked. All testified 
and believed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict general travel on 
the Road. 
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire gate, 
most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. These 
witnesses believed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not 
intended to restrict travel on the Road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was 
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by 
Barney Newitt in the late 50's and early 60's. Remnants of the gate sill exist, including a 
weathered piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too 
skimpy and too removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public 
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travel particularly in the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the Road and recalled 
no locks or road restrictions. 
22. That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient 
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that 
the gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole 
described as the remnants of a bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is 
overwhelmed by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all 
seasons between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
23. The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property, which was formerly a wire 
livestock gate, has been replaced with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and 
livestock to move through the fence when required. There has been a sign there indicating 
the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property has 
clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to 
"please close the gate." The sign is presently on the metal gate. The obstruction was 
obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle and sheep, not people. 
24. That the Road connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uinta National Forest. Paths and trails 
from the top or terminus of the Road travel over the mountain and connect to the Nebo Loop 
Road. 
25. That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were springs 
or ditches which created bogs at times making vehicular or wagon travel through or around 
the bogs difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was not restricted and 
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there was regular maintenance performed on the Road by Utah County, the United States 
Forest Service and landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or 
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest 
service requiring them to maintain the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was 
no evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense 
testified that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the 
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road from 
the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year 
during the decades of the 60fs and 70's. 
26. That the testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest service and 
adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting (during the 
winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters, 
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and 
maintenance of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. 
27. That vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and motorcycles all at various times traveled the 
entire length of the Road ending on forest service property. 
28. That the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that even if it is concluded (which 
this Court does not) that the Road was gated and locked in the late 50's and early 60's as 
described by the Butler's, the Road was used as necessary and convenient by the public for 
more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that time. 
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That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified 
engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that 
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was 
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court 
finds that the width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder 
on each side. 
The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline of the Road generated from a survey 
of the Road itself was introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by counsel 
for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different township or range than the legal 
description of the Defendants' properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that 
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to establish their respective 
boundaries as the center of the roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary 
line agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this Court to determine if there 
is a conflict in the two positions or how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The 
Court merely determines, today, that the Road as it presently exists is a public highway, 20 
feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each side. 
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was 
also substantial testimony that many people were unable to travel the Road after that time 
without gaining permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one 
exhibit shows a sign created by the County which allowed travel past the Butler gate, 
although admonishing travelers to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the 
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forest service. As noted above there have historically been gates across the Road for 
purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern 
and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared today. 
32. That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in 1997 it has been 
locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence 
was presented to clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road 
was obstructed and how many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to 
obtain the penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of days the 
Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service and testimony that 
persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6 or 7 years does not meet that 
burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable precision the number of 
days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty 
can be imposed. 
33. The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to 
a national roadway for decades and generations. 
34. That Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are therefore entitled to recover reasonable costs 
of court to be established by affidavit. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court hereby makes the following Conclusions of Law relying in whole or in part upon 
the foregoing Findings of Fact: 
Page 14 of 20 
011513 
1. That the Road has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public because it has been 
continuously used a public thoroughfare for a period often years, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §72-5-104 (and its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89). 
2. That three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route 
to be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
often years. ...Once the technical provision of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is 
a 'public highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962 P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Hebert City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307 at 310 (Utah 1997). That Plaintiffs successfully proved each of the foregoing 
factors by clear and convincing evidence. 
3. That there is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the public. 
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram, 626 
P.2d 445 at 449 (Utah 1981). 
4. That continuous use is established where "the public has made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary," Campbell, 
962 P.2d at 809. The "use may be continuous though not constant...provided it occurred as 
often as the claimant had occasion to choose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." 
Id at 809 (citing Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). 
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5. That Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property owners to 
restrict sportsman access to their property by posting: 
''Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 
square inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are 
displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates, 
and rights-of-way entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire 
exterior side must be painted." 
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the 
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would 
have to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of 
private property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted 
posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the 
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road 
from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what 
the plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road. 
6. That the term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority 
defines the term as a "street or way opening at both ends into another street or public 
highway, so that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul 
de sac, which is open only at one end." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law 
Publishing Company, Cleveland: 1946. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public 
use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by 
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all 
who desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as 
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the situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid 
out as a pubic highway by public authority." 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929). 
The court has also stated that a '"thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is 
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of 
passage." Gilmore v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280, 291 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964). 
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to 
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were 
reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a 
highway. Draper Citv v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of 
course the Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Canyon 
Corner Road" could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, 
only that the issue could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a 
substantially different posture. 
That the Road was a public thoroughfare before 1980. 
That having determined that the Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public before 
1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and 
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). 
That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe travel is 26 feet, 
including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3) foot shoulders on each side. 
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10. That Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains 
a structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days 
upon notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover . . . 
. (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete." 
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable costs of court as the prevailing party to be established by 
affidavit. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered, 
adjudged, and decreed as follows: 
1. That the Road from the gate at the Butler residence to the Uinta National Forest Boundary 
is hereby declared a public highway within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (and 
its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89). 
2. That the location of Road is where it presently exists. 
3. That the scope (or width) of the right-of-way of the Road west of the gate at the Butler 
Residence is 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side and a 20 foot travel width, the 
centerline of which is the center of the exiting Bennie Creek Road. 
4. That the Defendants and their successors and assigns shall not take any action that blocks, 
locks, or otherwise interferes with public access to the Road. 
5. That the Defendants immediately remove any and all structures, blockages, gates, fences or 
anything that blocks, locks, or otherwise interferes with public access across the Road. 
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That Plaintiff Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against Defendants 
Randy Butler and Donna Butler at the rate of $10 per day from July 29,1997 to the date of 
the order, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of judgment is hereby denied. 
7, That Plaintiffs are.awarded judgment, joint and several, against Defendants Randy Butler and 
Donna Butlp^Blaine and Linda Evans for reasonable costs of courtdetermined by a verified 
r ^ / / bill of Qbsts pursuant to URCP Rule 54 in the amount of $ for Utah County 
\ S£^ and $ for the State of Utah. 
$• Plaintiff Utah County is ordered to record this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in the records of the Utah County Recorder. 
9. For interest on the Judgement at the legal rate from date of the entry of judgment. 
DATED this /(p day of 7T-**V 
Notice of objections must be submitted to the Court anarSiafflae^Pwithin five (5) days after 
service, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid, this//^day of/ IMJJ^ . 2004, 
to the following: 
MARK E. ARNOLD 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
57 West 200 South #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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L:\Rob\Civil LitigationVBennie Creek Road\Pleadings\Findings a^jQo^n^tusions-Final.wpd 
Page 20 of 20 
f> n i o i l 
TabC 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
This opinion is subject to revision before fJQy Q £ 2006 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Utah County; and State of 
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Department of Natural 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Kl Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and 
Linda Evans appeal the trial court's conclusion that Bennie Creek 
Road (the Road) is a public highway under Utah Code section 72-5-
104(1) (the Dedication Statute). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104(1) (2001). Utah County cross-appeals the trial court's 
decision to deny statutory damages caused by Defendants' refusal 
to remove a gate after receiving service of notice. We affirm in 
part and remand for a determination of statutory damages owed to 
Utah County. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040809-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 2, 2006) 
2006 UT App 444 
BACKGROUND 
f2 The Road runs west from U.S. Highway 89 into the Uinta 
National Forest (the National Forest), providing access to 
camping areas, hiking trails, and the Nebo Loop. Portions of the 
Road cross Defendants1 properties before reaching the National 
Forest. In 1996, Defendants prevented public access to the Road 
by erecting a metal gate. On July 29, 1997, the Utah County 
Board of Commissioners served Defendants with notice ordering the 
removal of the gate from the Road. Because Defendants refused to 
remove the gate, Utah County and the State of Utah Department of 
Natural Resources (Plaintiffs) brought this action to have the 
Road declared a public highway and to force the removal of the 
metal gate. 
%3 Following an eight-day bench trial in June 2004, the court 
concluded that the Road had been dedicated to public use long ago 
and ordered the gate removed. At trial, the court heard 
testimony from previous and current landowners, various users of 
the Road, National Forest workers, and public employees assigned 
to maintain the Road. The testimony conflicted as to the prior 
use of gates, placement of no-trespassing signs, and ownership 
reactions to public use of the road. After evaluating the 
credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the trial 
court ultimately determined that the Road had been open to public 
use from the mid-1920s until about 1980. 
1|4 The trial court issued a memorandum decision directing 
Plaintiffs to prepare a final order containing factual findings 
and conclusions of law consistent with those outlined in the 
memorandum. Defendants objected to the proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order submitted by Plaintiffs, and 
requested a hearing. The trial court signed the proposed order 
without holding a hearing. Defendants now appeal. 
1[5 Despite concluding that the Road had been dedicated to 
public use and that Defendants did not remove the gate after 
receiving proper notice, the trial court refused to award Utah 
County its demand for statutory damages. In refusing to make the 
award, the trial court ruled that conflicting evidence in the 
record as to whether the gate was locked prevented the court from 
being able to accurately calculate damages. Utah County cross-
appeals the refusal to award statutory damages. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
%6 Defendants argue that the trial court erred by determining 
that the Road was dedicated to public use under Utah Code section 
72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). " [W]hen 
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a public 
highway has been established . . . , we review the decision for 
20040809-CA 2 
correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its 
application of the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997). 
f7 Defendants also assert that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to rule on their objections to the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In challenging 
a discretionary decision of the trial court, Defendants must 
demonstrate that the court exceeded the measure of discretion the 
law affords it. This is done by showing that there is "no 
reasonable basis for the [court's] decision." Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
%8 In its cross-appeal, Utah County claims that in light of 
Defendants' refusal to remove the gate after receiving proper 
notice in 1997, Utah County is entitled to an award for statutory 
damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001). We review a 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial court. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
I. PUBLIC ROAD 
f9 For a road to be dedicated to public use, it must be 
"continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104; see also Simpson, 942 P.2d at 
310. Defendants claim that (a) the use relied upon by the trial 
court was not public use, and that (b) the use was not continuous 
(c) for a period of ten years. 
a. Public Use 
If 10 Defendants argue that because most of Plaintiffs' witnesses 
used the Road as trespassers, the witnesses should not be 
considered members of the public for purposes of determining that 
the Road was dedicated to public use. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104(1). Defendants, however, provide no legal support for their 
argument, nor a compelling reason why trespassers cannot be 
considered members of the public. 
1|ll In fact, "under Utah law . . . permissive use cannot result 
in either adverse possession or dedication of private property to 
the public." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 
UT App 104,1(19, 132 P. 3d 687 (holding that permissive use may not 
be considered in a public dedication determination). Under the 
Dedication Statute, public use cannot include permissive use, nor 
can it include use by "owners of adjoining property." Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). 
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Defendants' proposed interpretation would render the Dedication 
Statute ineffective because no use could ever constitute public 
use. To give the Dedication Statute proper effect, we hold that 
non-permissive use must be considered public use. We therefore 
agree with the trial court that trespassers are members of the 
"public" for purposes of determining whether the Dedication 
Statute has been satisfied. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(2001). 
b. Continuous Use 
fl2 Defendants claim that, even if the trial court properly 
defined public use, the trial court erred in concluding that the 
Road was used continuously because there were gates along the 
road and seasonal weather conditions made the Road impassable at 
times. 
fl3 While there was conflicting testimony at trial regarding the 
status and purpose of these gates, we are not in a position to 
closely scrutinize the factual findings of the trial court in 
public thoroughfare dedication cases. See Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997) (holding that factual 
issues in public dedication cases do not lend themselves to close 
review). Therefore, unless the findings of fact are clearly 
unsupported by the record, we will seek only to apply the trial 
court's factual findings to the law of abandonment and public 
dedication. 
1J14 This court has interpreted the Dedication Statute as 
requiring "continuous and uninterrupted use of a road over ten 
years where 'the public, even though not consisting of a great 
many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use . . . as 
often as they found it convenient or necessary.1" Campbell, 962 
P.2d at 809 (emphasis added) (omission in original) (citation 
omitted). "[U]se may be continuous though not constant. . . . 
[Pjrovided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or 
chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id. 
(omission in original) (emphasis added) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
1|15 Even though it appears that there were instances when 
seasonal weather rendered the Road temporarily impassible, the 
trial court found that the Road was used by the public whenever 
it was convenient or necessary. Additionally, the court held 
that the gates in question were generally unlocked from about 
1925 until 1980 and were used merely to restrict the travel of 
livestock, not people. These times of impasse amount to "mere 
intermission[s]" of public use. Id. We therefore agree with the 
trial court's conclusion that the Road was in continuous use by 
the public for an extended period of time. 
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c. Period of Ten Years 
1(16 Defendants argue that the trial court erred because it 
failed to identify an exact ten-year period during which the Road 
was continuously used. Language in the Dedication Statute 
requires a finding of continuous use for at least ten years, and 
therefore permits a finding of public dedication based on a time 
period greater than ten years. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(2 001). The trial court determined that the Road was 
continuously used by the public from about 1925 until 1980, or 
approximately fifty-five years. This fifty-five year span of 
public use clearly exceeds the statutory minimum requirement of 
ten years. 
%11 Defendants1 arguments on this issue imply a challenge to the 
trial court's factual findings that the Road was continuously 
open to the public for a sufficient period of time. By failing 
to offer case law supporting their position and merely pointing 
to conflicting evidence in the record concerning the time period 
issue, Defendants simply invite this court to meddle with the 
trial court's findings of fact. Again, we will not closely 
scrutinize the factual findings of a trial court when reviewing 
public dedication cases; we seek only to ensure that the trial 
court has properly applied those facts to the law. See Simpson, 
942 P.2d at 309-10. Therefore, we agree with the trial court 
that Plaintiffs properly demonstrated that the Road was 
continuously used by the public for at least ten years. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). 
II. OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER 
[^18 After the trial court's decision, Defendants filed 
objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and order, with a request for a hearing, arguing insufficiency of 
the evidence. Despite Defendants' objections, the trial court 
entered the proposed findings and order without another hearing. 
Defendants argue that in ruling on their objections without 
holding a hearing, the trial court abused its discretion. We 
disagree. 
fl9 The trial court is afforded great latitude in determining 
whether a hearing will be held on non-dispositive motions. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e). Under rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court "may hold a hearing on any motion" but 
is not required to do so. Id. The proposed order eventually 
adopted by the trial court was sufficiently similar to the 
memorandum decision to provide a reasonable basis on which the 
trial court could decide to deny a hearing on the objections. 
Because Defendant's motion was simply an objection to the factual 
findings of the trial court, the court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to hold a hearing on Defendants' 
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objection. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993). 
III. DAMAGES 
1J20 In its cross-appeal, Utah County challenges the trial 
court's ruling that it is not entitled to statutory damages for 
the time the metal gate remained across the Road after Utah 
County served Defendants notice. Utah County argues that 
Defendants' failure to remove the gate after receiving proper 
service of notice automatically results in the statutory penalty. 
Under section 72-7-104, when an installation is not removed 
within ten days after service of notice is completed, "[a] 
highway authority may recover: (a) the costs and expenses 
incurred in removing the installation, serving notice, and the 
costs of a lawsuit if any; and (b) [ten dollars] for each day the 
installation remain[s] within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4) (2001). More than nine 
years have passed since Defendants received service of notice, 
and the gate has apparently not been removed. 
1J21 Utah County argues that it met its burden to show that 
service was completed and that the gate remained in place 
throughout this litigation. Utah County claims that the trial 
court did not have discretion to deny statutory damages. We 
agree. Pursuant to section 72-7-104(5), when the highway 
authority is granted a judgment after the removal of an 
installation is contested, it is entitled to the remedies 
referred to above. See id. § 72-7-104(5). It is clear from the 
record that Defendants did not remove the gate subsequent to 
receiving notice from Utah County. The record reflects that the 
trial court was reticent to award Utah County these costly 
damages. In declining to award damages, the trial court pointed 
to conflicting testimony regarding whether the gate was locked, 
despite finding that the Road was indeed a public highway, that 
notice to remove the gate was properly served, and that the gate 
was not removed. 
1[22 We conclude that the installation of the gate clearly falls 
under the proscribed structures "of any kind or character" 
regardless of whether it was locked. Id. § 72-7-104(1). The 
record shows that the trial court gave much consideration to 
whether the gate remained locked after Defendants received 
notice. Such a factual determination is inapplicable to section 
72-7-104(4), which concerns itself only with installations across 
public highways, not whether the installations are locked. See 
id. § 72-7-104(4). Because Utah County made a proper showing 
that the gate remained in place after notice was completed, the 
trial court should have awarded section 72-7-104(4) damages. 
1]23 We recognize that this decision will, in effect, award Utah 
County substantial statutory damages despite its failure to take 
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advantage of the self-help remedies available to it under section 
72-7-104(1). See id. § 72-7-104(1). We also recognize that this 
decision will force landowners to think twice about deciding 
whether to remove similar installations after receiving notice 
from a highway authority--even when the landowner intends to 
challenge the highway authority's decisions in court. The ten 
dollar per day penalty begins to accrue ten days after notice is 
completed, and continues to accrue until the installation is 
removed. The statute simply does not provide for a tolling of 
the penalty during a legal dispute between a landowner and a 
highway authority, nor does it limit the total amount a highway 
authority may recover. We are therefore constrained to reward 
the highway authority's decision to not remove the installation 
and conclude that damages should be calculated from ten days 
after completion of service of notice until such time as the gate 
is removed. Surely the legislature did not anticipate such a 
long gap between the completion of service of notice and removal 
of the installation. But the plain language of the statute 
prevents us from interpreting the provision for statutory damages 
otherwise. See id. § 72-7-104 (1)-(5) . 
CONCLUSION 
K24 The trial court properly applied its factual conclusions to 
the law of abandonment and public dedication of a highway in 
finding that the Road is a public highway. The challenges by 
Defendants are largely an attack on the trial court's factual 
findings, which in public dedication cases, we will not closely 
scrutinize. However, the trial court erred by failing to award 
statutory damages after concluding that the gate remained across 
the Road well after Utah County completed service of notice. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Road is a 
public highway under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), and remand 
the case for a calculation of statutory damages consistent with 
this opinion and Utah Code section 72-7-104. 
Ku^fl/J.J^^L 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
H25 WE CONCUR: 
6Jrt<* 
Carolyn^. McHugh, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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Utah County and State of Utah, 
by and through its Department 
of Natural Resources and 
Division of Wildlife Resources, 
Respondents, 
v. 
Randy Butler, Donna Butler, 
Margaret Condley, Elizabeth 
Condley, Blaine Evans, Linda 
Evans, and John Does 1-15, 
Petitioners. 
Case No. 20070009-SC 
20040809-CA 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on January 3, 2007. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether trespassing may constitute a public use pursuant 
to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. 
2. Whether the district court erred in its determination 
that the public had continuously used the road at issue in this 
case according to the requirements of the Dedication Statute. 
3. Whether the district court failed to designate a 
specific ten-year period of continuous use and, if so, whether 
that failure constituted reversible error. 
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4) to the facts of this case. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
Dated i^jMf-
For The Court: 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 16, 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered 
to the parties listed below: 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
1594 W N TEMPLE STE 300 
PO BOX 140855 
SALT LAKE'CITY UT 84114-0855 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS PC 
AMERICAN PLAZA II STE 105 
57 W 200 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
M. CORT GRIFFIN 
ROBERT J. MOORE 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY OFFICE 
100 E CENTER ST #2400 
PROVO UT 8 4 606 
LISA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT 
ATTN: AMBER / JENNI / CALLI 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO UT 84 603 
Dated this March 16, 2007. 
Deputy Clerk / 
Case No. 20070009 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20040809 
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TabE 
PROTECTION OF HIGHWAYS 72-7-104 
(1) the highway authority acquires right of ingress and egress by gift, 
agreement, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise: or 
(2) no right of ingress or egress exists between the right-of-way and the 
adjoining property. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 134; C. 1953, 27-12-134; deleted the former first paragraph, 
27-12-134; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, which provided that highway authorities are 
§ 173. authorized to adopt regulations and require 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- permits and surety bonds for structures or 
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered objects on public highway rights-of-way; and 
this section, which formerly appeared as § made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
72-7-104. Installations constructed in violation of rules — 
Rights of highway authorities to remove or re-
quire removal. 
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, 
repairs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, 
sewer, ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object 
6f any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway without 
complying with this title, the highway authority having jurisdiction over the 
right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person, 
firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or 
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the 
installation from the right-of-way. 
(2) Notice under Subsection (l)(b) may be served by: 
(a) personal service; or 
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, or corporation by certified 
mail; and 
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for ten days. 
(3) If the installation is not removed within ten days after the notice is 
complete, the highway authority may remove the installation at the expense of 
the person, firm, or corporation. 
(4) A highway authority may recover: 
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the installation, 
serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; and 
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way 
after notice was complete. 
(5) (a) If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence, 
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to 
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action 
to abate the installation as a public nuisance. 
(b) If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway 
authority may recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as 
provided in Subsection (4). 
(6) The department, its agents, or employees, if acting in good faith, incur no 
liability for causing removal of an installation within a right-of-way of a 
highway as provided in this section. 
(7) The actions of the department under this section are not subject to the 
Provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
637 
72-7-105 TRANSPORTATION CODE 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 135; 1990, ch. this section, which formerly appeared as S 
300, § 1; C. 1953, 27-12-135; renumbered by 27-12-135; in Subsection (1) substituted "this 
L. 1998, ch. 270, § 174. title" for "this chapter"; and made stylistic 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- changes, 
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Determination of nature of road. 
Nature of remedies. 
Removal. 
Determination of nature of road. 
Whether county officers were immune from 
suit for trespass after they had removed a 
locked gate from a roadway depended upon the 
public or private nature of the road as deter-
mined by the trial court and not the commis-
sioners. Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 
2d 387, 483 R2d 430 (1971). 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 138; 1991, ch. 
137, § 62; C. 1953, 27-12-138; renumbered 
by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 175. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-138; divided Subsections (1) and (2), add-
ing the (a) and (b) designations; in Subsection 
(1), m the introductory \anguage, substituted 
"A person may not" for "It is unlawful to"; in 
Nature of remedies . 
None of the remedies of this statute is exclu-
sive, nor are the remedies restrictive of the 
common-law right to summarily remove ob-
structions from a highway. Blonquist v. Summit 
County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 R2d 430 (1971). 
Removal. 
If a road is public, notice that a gate will be 
removed does not make summary removal un-
lawful. Blonquist v. Summit Countv, 25 Utah 
2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971). 
Subsection (2)(a) added "Except under Subsec-
tion (2)(b)" after "Vehicles"; in Subsection (2Kb) 
added "A highway authority may prohibit or 
may require removal of" and substituted uon 
any highway under their jurisdiction" for "are 
permitted to remain on any highway contrary 
to instructions from the highway authority 
having jurisdiction over the highway"; and 
made styiistic and punctuation changes. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Highways § 223 et seq. 
Streets, and Bridges § 362 et seq. 
72-7-105. Obstructing traffic on sidewalks or highways 
prohibited. 
(1) A person may not: 
(a) drive or place any vehicle, animal, or other thing upon or along any 
sidewalk except in crossing the sidewalk to or from abutting property; or 
(b) permit the vehicle, animal, or other thing to remain on or across any 
sidewalk in a way that impedes or obstructs the ordinary use of the 
sidewalk. 
(2) (a) Except under Subsection (2)(b), vehicles, building material, or other 
similar things may be placed temporarily on highways in a manner that 
will not impede, endanger, or obstruct ordinary traffic. 
(b) A highway authority may prohibit or may require the removal of 
vehicles, building material, or other obstructions on any highway under 
their jurisdiction. 
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